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Abstract 
We analyze the dynamics public and private sector employment, using the natural experiment 
provided by the partial privatization of the Bangladeshi jute industry. Although the public 
sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, this excess was substantially 
eroded by the end of the period we study. The extent of such erosion differs between white-
collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. 
Our findings are consistent with the idea that the central authorities used yardstick 
competition to reduce public sector managerial rents. We argue that partial privatization 
increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, since 
heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers  
Keywords: privatization, yardstick competition, excess employment, collusion.  
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Privatization is normally viewed as a strategy that increases the internal efficiency of 
publicly owned firms. Public sector jobs in many developing countries often yield rents, as 
wages tend to be larger than the opportunity cost of the workers.  Excess job creation in the 
public sector is a way of making transfers to special interests, and a source of patronage and 
political influence. Following Coate and Morris (1995), one can argue that making transfers 
in an inefficient manner, via job creation, maybe more viable than direct transfers since the 
populace at large2 is unable to observe employment requirements of the public enterprise 
directly. Boycko, Shliefer and Vishny (1996) argue that privatization restricts the ability of 
politicians to make transfers to special interests, by employment generation, since the 
subsidies required to support such transfers become explicit. This argument provides a reason 
why privatization increases internal efficiency in publicly owned firms. 
In this paper, we argue that partial privatization – the privatization of some firms in 
an industry, while leaving the rest in the state sector – provides useful external information, 
about the firms which remain in the public sector. This information may reduce the ability to 
sustain inefficient practices, such as excessive employment levels. In conjunction with 
yardstick competition, partial privatization may play an important role in increasing 
efficiency in public sector firms. The role of yardstick competition in the regulation of a 
multiple public sector firms is well recognized.3 However, such yardstick competition may be 
undermined by collusion, say between public sector managers. Yardstick competition is more 
likely to effective in a situation of heterogeneous ownership, when different firms have 
different objectives as private sector firms have no incentive to collude with public sector 
 
2 Or other “principals’’ such as the central budgetary authorities or international financial 
institutions. 
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managers and raise employment levels. This argument may be relevant in other contexts – for 
example, the entry of foreign firms may undermine cozy business practices and provide 
valuable information to consumers or stockholders. 
We present evidence for this argument using firm level employment data from the jute 
industry in Bangladesh over the 1983-1994. In 1982 the military regime in Bangladesh 
privatized 31 of the 62 mills in the jute industry, while retaining the remainder in the public 
sector. This natural experiment is of interest in itself, since it provides a unique data set where 
one may disentangle the effects of ownership structure on economic performance. Bhaskar 
and Khan (1995) have analyzed the early years of this natural experiment. Our empirical work 
extends this analysis to the dynamic effects of privatization over time. In addition, we argue 
that the employment dynamics illustrate the informational role of partial privatization, in 
disciplining the public sector.  
Our substantive findings are presented in terms of measures of public sector “excess 
employment”. We have two alternative measures, depending on whether it adjusts for output 
change or not. The adjusted measure shows excess employment in all categories of worker in 
1988, but this excess is more than eliminated for the manual worker category by the end of 
the period. For white-collar workers, excess employment is reduced, but continues to be 
significant. We argue that this dynamic pattern is consistent with the notion of yardstick 
competition, where central authorities use information on private sector behavior to constrain 
public sector managers. Our second substantive and intriguing finding is that white-collar 
workers are the main beneficiaries of public sector employment generation – indeed, even 
3 See Shliefer (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1994) and Sobel (1999) for analysis of the role of 
yardstick competition in the context of the regulation of several firms, all of which are 
homogeneous in ownership. 
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when pressures for employment reduction are very high, manual workers seem to bear the 
brunt of the burden.  
The layout of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 1 sets out the institutional 
background and describes our data. Section 2 sets out a formal model of the role of 
privatization in the context of yardstick competition. Section 3 reports the empirical results, 
and the final section concludes. 
1. Background & Data 
In 1982, the government of General Ershad initiated the New Industrial Policy, under 
which over 650 enterprises were privatized. In the jute industry, 31 of the 62 mills were 
privatized, while the rest were retained in the public sector. This policy dubbed as "re-
privatization" was a partial reversal of the nationalization of the jute industry implemented in 
1972, soon after the independence of Bangladesh.  The jute mills that were owned by 
Bangladeshi nationals at the time of nationalization were returned to their former owners, 
while the mills that had belonged to West Pakistani nationals, continued to remain under 
public ownership. This partial privatization provides a panel data set, which allows us to infer 
ownership effects on employment. As the selection of mills to be privatized was not based on 
any economic criterion, but rather on the nationality of their former owners, our analysis is 
not subject to selection bias. Finally, the manner of re-privatization implied that government 
had no incentive to improve performance of the privatized mills, say by reducing labor, prior 
to privatization.4
Previous work by Bhaskar and Khan (1995) compared employment levels in 1988 and 
1983 and found that public sector mills had "excess employment" of white-collar workers, of 
 
4 This appears to be an important factor in many privatizations. Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001, p 321) find that “much of the firm performance improvement associated with 
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the order of one-third. There was no significant difference in the employment of manual 
workers between public and private sectors. In the period we study (1988-94), the jute sector 
was under increasing financial pressure. The financial losses accumulated in private and 
public sector firms were financed primarily by loans from publicly owned banks. The 
worsening financial performance was attributed by observers to the decline in demand for 
Bangladeshi jute products. By 1994 industry output had fallen by 20 percent relative to 1988. 
The World Bank prompted the government to reduce capacity in the jute industry, and in 
response, the government instituted a Voluntary Departure Scheme for staff and workers in 
the public mills. In July 1989 the benefits for departure from state owned enterprises were 
increased substantially. For example, an employee with 30 years service was entitled to 5 
years pay as gratuity, in addition to pension benefits. These measures culminated in the World 
Bank’s Jute Sector Adjustment Credit program of 1994, which financed restructuring of the 
industry and met the costs of the Voluntary Departure Scheme. 
Our data consists of mill-specific employment levels of four categories of worker for 
the years 1983, 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1994. The first two categories, managers and clerical 
staff, are white collar. We also have data on permanent manual workers and total manual 
workers. The data was collected from records kept by the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation 
and the Bangladesh Jute Mills Association, organizations representing public and private 
sector mills respectively. As privatized mills were legally unable to layoff employees for a 
year after their privatization in 1982, the recorded 1983 figures may be taken to be the pre-
privatization figure. We should mention that casual manual employment could fluctuate on a 
day-to-day basis. Therefore, measurement error is likely to be greater in this category than for 
permanent employees.  
privatization actually occurs over the three years before the government reduces its 
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2. The Model 
The purpose of this section is to set out two simple models which illustrate the 
informational role that partial privatization can play in the regulation of the public sector.  
One reason for setting out this model is that in the existing literature, the existence of a 
private sector does not play any important role. Indeed, in standard models of yardstick 
competition, the regulator will be able to play off public sector firms against each other, and 
heterogeneity of ownership plays no role.   
Our analysis uses the private sector mills as the benchmark. The objective function of 
privately owned mills is relatively straightforward. We assume that these owners maximize 
profits and do not have any preference for employment-maximization. The typical private 
firm is family owned, and ownership is relatively concentrated. Even if there are principal-
agent problems between owners and managers, these do not give rise to any pressures for 
employment generation.5 Thus employment in firm i, Ei, set equal to  Zi, the profit 
maximizing level of employment.  
Turning to the public sector firm, we distinguish three distinct types of actor, 
reflecting three distinct levels in decision making:  
a) Firm level managers, who are “agents”, in the standard sense. 
b) The central authority regulating the public sector managers, in the ministries of 
industry and finance. The central authority sets the contracts for public sector 
managers.  
ownership.’’ 
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c) The overseers , i.e. the general population and international institutions such as the 
World Bank that monitor and evaluate the performance of the central authority.  
While the overseers do not directly control the central authority, they retain the 
ability to “punish” any failings. The general public can do this by withdrawing 
political support and international agencies by reducing the level of aid and 
financial transfers.  
Both central authorities and firm level managers may have preferences for 
employment creation, although it is likely that pressures for employment creation are more 
severe at local rather than at central level. In particular, local politicians may pressurize 
public firms to create employment for politically important constituencies, a phenomenon we 
call "clientelism".6  
The firm level manager's ability to expand employment is subject to constraints and 
incentives imposed by the central authorities. However, the central authority will lack 
information on local employment requirements, which is available only to the managers.7  In 
addition, they may also lack the incentive themselves to rigorously regulate the managers, 
either because they also like to create employment, or because of a desire for a quiet life. 
5 There do appear to be some agency problems, which are unique to our milieau, and are not 
of the usual sort arising from dispersed share ownership. The joint family system is prone to 
conflict and such conflicts between owners sometimes allow managers increased leverage. 
6 Clientelism refers to a situation, where politicians dole out public sector jobs in order to 
maintain their political support base (see for example Shliefer and Vishny, 1994). Bhaskar 
and Khan (1995) argue that this explanation for public sector excess employment in the 
white-collar sections is more plausible than a "welfarist" explanation, which would generate 
excess employment among manual rather than white-collar workers. Clientelism can be 
augmented by sociological factors, whereby top managers in the public sector create jobs for 
the middle classes to whom they are tied by bonds of kinship or social affinity. 
7 Alternatively, one may think of the principal as an international financial institution (such as 
the World Bank) or the general populace, which wishes to constrain excess employment. 
Similarly, we may also think of the agent as the local politician who exerts pressure on the 
manager to expand employment. 
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Finally, the overseers are uninformed, and also lack the ability to directly set the incentive 
scheme of managers. 8
More formally, we assume that the central authorities would like to have employment 
in firm i, Ei, set equal to α + Zi, where Zi is the profit maximizing  level of employment, and 
α≥0. The preferences of central authorities are given by 
V(Ei,t) = -[Ei-(Zi+α)]2 – t ,                     (1) 
where t is the payment made to the manager. However, the central authorities do not know the 
level of Zi , which is known only to the manager of the public firm. The central authorities 
have the information that Zi = Z+εi where Z is distributed with a density function f on the 
interval  [a, b] and εi is distributed with a density function g on the interval [-e, e]. Z and εi are 
independently distributed. It follows that Zi has support [a-e,b+e]. 
The manager would like to create extra employment, possibly beyond that desired by the 
central authorities. His preferences are given by 
U(Ei,t) = -λ[Ei-(Zi+β)]2 + t ,                   (2) 
where β>α is a parameter, which measures the degree of employment bias of the manager. t is 
the amount of transfer made from the central authorities to the manager.  The central 
authorities can provide incentives by making t depend upon on  Ei, so that we can write t(Ei ). 
Bear in mind that t represents the expected value of incentive measures, such as promotions to 
a higher level, which can be made contingent on managerial performance.  λ is a parameter, 
                                                 
8 These pressures for employment generation at the level of the public enterprise will 
vary depending upon the category of worker. One might expect that public sector managers 
wish to dole out jobs to those with whom they are connected by bonds of kinship or social 
affinity. This would tend to bias employment creation in favour of  white-collar workers 
rather than manual workers. Differences in the extent of political clout between types of 
workers may also influence employment creation, although the direction of bias is not 
obvious apriori. 
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which measures the relative importance of employment objectives (as compared to financial 
or career motivations) in the manager’s utility function. 
 Consider first the case where the central authority does not provide incentives to the 
manager for reducing employment, i.e. t does not depend upon E. This could arise either 
because the central authority likes employment to the same extent as the manager (α = β), or 
because the conflict of interest is small, and central authority simply seeks a quiet life. In this 
case, the manager simply chooses Ei = Zi + β. When all firms are in the private sector, there 
will be some variation in employment norms across firms (since Zi = Z+εi, with εi, varying 
across firms), but this variation will be small. Thus the overseers will not get any information 
on the extent of employment bias in the public sector. Partial privatization has a clear role 
here – the privatized firms will reduce employment levels, by setting Ei = Zi. Thus the 
expected difference in employment levels between the two types of firm will be β. This can 
now be observed by the overseers, thereby providing pressure on the central authorities, who 
in turn will be compelled to provide incentives to the public sector managers to reduce 
employment.  
 Our second model abstracts from the role of the overseers, and considers how partial 
privatization enhances the ability of the central authority to more effectively regulate the 
managers. To simplify exposition, let us assume that α = 0, so the central authority has no 
employment bias. Let us consider a transfer schedule  t(Ei). The manager has some outside 
level of reservation utility, u, and the central authorities must ensure that he gets this utility 
level regardless of the realization of Zi.  The manager’s first order condition for utility 
maximization is  
2λ[Ei-Zi-β)] = t'(Ei).                        (3) 
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From this condition, it is clear that if the central authority sets t'(Ei) = -2λβ, the manager will 
find it optimal to Ei = Zi . In other words,  the central authorities can provide incentives so 
that the manager chooses employment optimally (i.e. without any excess bias), by taxing 
employment at rate 2λβ. Letting T denote the fixed (wage) element of the manager’s 
compensation, the incentive scheme which ensures optimal employment choice has the form 
t(Ei) = T –2λβEi..            (4)         
The utility of the manager under the scheme, given that he chooses employment optimally, is 
given by t(Ei) - λβ2. which must exceed his reservation utility u for all possible values of Ei.   
His utility is lowest when employment is highest, i.e. when Zi = b+e. This implies that the 
manager’s fixed component is given by  
T = u + λβ2+ 2λβ (b+e).                       (5) 
Notice that for any value of  Zi , the manager gets a rent of  2λβ(b+e-Zi), which is strictly 
positive unless desired employment is at its highest possible level.  That is, the central 
authorities have to make costly transfers in order to provide incentives, i.e. the manager gets a 
payment, which is in general above his reservation wage (which equals the sum of his 
reservation utility u, and the term λβ2  which is the disutility cost on the job from choosing 
employment without bias). Thus at any Zi which is below the maximum possible level (b+e), 
the manager gets a rent, since his payment is greater than his reservation wage. The expected 
cost to the central authorities of this incentive scheme can be computed, and is given by 
E(C) = u +2λβ [b+e- E(Z)] + λβ2 .                      (6) 
E(Z)] is the expectation of Z. If the provision of incentives is sufficiently costly, the central 
authorities may prefer to provide low incentives, in which case there will be excess 
employment. This will also be the case if the ability to provide incentives is limited, say 
because promotion opportunities are limited in the public sector, 
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Yardstick competition 
Yardstick competition may enable the central authorities to reduce managerial rents 
when there are multiple public sector firms, (i.e. even where there is no privatization), as has 
been noted in the regulatory context (see Sobel (1999),  Shleifer (1985) and Laffont and 
Tirole (1994)). The central authorities can provide incentives by making t depend upon the 
employment of an individual firm relative to the average employment level of other firms, 
which we denote by E-i, so that t(Ei-E-i).  Indeed, a linear incentive scheme with the same 
slope (t’=-2λβ) will induce the manager to choose employment appropriately so that Ei = Zi.  
Under yardstick competition, it is cheaper to satisfy the individual rationality 
constraint of the manager. Let us assume that every other firm chooses employment 
optimally, so that Ej = Zj for j≠i, and consider the individual rationality constraint for manager 
i.  Although it is assumed that manager i knows Z and his own value of εi, he may or may not 
know the average value of ε-i, and the two cases give rise to two different possibilities. In the 
first case, the maximum possible difference between εi and ε-i is  2e. The individual rationality 
constraint implies that the fixed component of pay under yardstick competition must equal 
Ty = u + λβ2+ 4λβe.                         (7) 
Since relative employment of firm i only varies between 2e and –2e, the informational rents 
of the manager are reduced, especially if individual firm specific uncertainty (εi) is small 
relative to uncertainty about the industry wide term Z. Informational rents can be reduced 
even more if the individual firm does not know the average value of ε-i.  For in this case, the 
expectation of the manager is that this is zero, and hence the individual rationality constraint 
need only hold in expectation given any value of εi. To summarize, if all public sector 
managers act individualistically, then yardstick competition can play a useful role even in the 
absence of the private sector.  
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Collusion with Repeated Interaction 
Yardstick competition based incentives schemes for the public sector are however 
vulnerable to collusion between the managers of different public enterprises. Such collusion 
may be sustained relatively easily since managers are involved in a repeated interaction. The 
basic idea is that managers could all be better off if they increased employment in a 
coordinated way. As managers are only penalized for raising employment relative to the 
industry average, none of them will be punished.  
We assume that at every date k, the basic one period model is played anew. That is, at 
the beginning of the period k, nature chooses Zi(k), and these draws are independently and 
identically distributed across periods. We assume that the central authority chooses and 
yardstick competition incentive scheme at the beginning, at k=0. The scheme is stationary, so 
that transfers in period k to manager i only depend upon the vector of employment levels 
chosen in that period. At the end of each period, employment levels of each manager are 
observed. Managers maximize the discounted sum of payoffs,  where δ is the discount factor. 
 Let us first consider expected payoffs of the managers when they play a Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game. In this case each manager sets Ei =Zi. Expected utility is given 
by 
E(UN)  = -λβ2 + Ty + 2λβE(εi-ε-i) = u + 4λβe.        (8) 
Suppose now that managers collude by setting higher levels of employment. 
Specifically, let us assume that they choose employment equal to Ei =Zi + αβ, where 0< α ≤1. 
  
E(UC) =   -λ[(1-α)β]2 + Ty + 2λβE(εi-ε-i) = u + 4λβe + λ[1-(1-α)2 ]β2 .  (9) 
We see therefore that E(UC)> E(UN), so that the managers can achieve a higher level of utility 
by colluding. It remains to see whether collusion can be sustained. Consider a repeated game 
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strategy profile where each manager chooses Ei =Zi + αβ as long as every manager has done 
so in every previous period. However, if any manager has failed to comply with the collusive 
scheme at any time in the past, manager i chooses Ei = Zi, i.e. they revert to playing a Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game.  Given this strategy profile, a manager can benefit in a single 
period by reducing employment, and his optimal deviation is to choose Ei = Zi. The benefit 
from deviating is given by 
-λ[β2 –α2 β2 ] +2λαβ2 = λα2β2.      (10) 
We see therefore that the one period benefit from deviating is independent of  Zi. A deviation 
is not profitable provided that the one period gain is less than the discounted present value of 
the losses from the breakdown of collusion. That is, the following condition must be satisfied 
δ/(1-δ) ≥ α/(2-α).          (11) 
We see therefore that full collusion (α =1) can be sustained under the relatively mild 
condition that  the discount factor is greater than one-half. Indeed, some degree of collusion 
can always be sustained for any value of the discount factor.  
We note here that collusion need not be explicit – there may well be a culture in the 
public sector of not pursuing aggressive employment cuts and a manager who deviates from 
this may well become quite unpopular. Apart from repeated game considerations, social 
sanctions may make yardstick competition ineffectual when it is restricted to the public 
sector.  Privatization and Collusion 
Let us now consider the role of partial  privatization. Managers in the private sector 
will seek to maximize profits and therefore, they will not have any employment bias. Since 
the central authority’s objectives may differ from profit maximization, we assume that private 
sector managers will set Ei = Zi – σ, where σ  parameterizes the difference between profit 
maximizing behavior and central authority preferences for employment. Let m denote the 
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number of private sector firms and let n denote the total number of firms. Thus the relevant 
employment measure for public sector firm i is given by  
E’-i   = [mσ+∑j≠iEj]/(n-1).         (12) 
That is, we assume that the central authority operates a yardstick competition 
incentive scheme, where each public sector firm is taxed linearly on (Ei - E’-i ), where the 
yardstick E’-i   takes into account the fact that private firms choose employment differently 
from what the central authority would like. 
Let us now examine the implications of partial privatization for collusive behavior. It 
is easy to verify that the expected utility of the public firm manager  is the same as before, in 
the event that all public firm managers maximize single period utility.  However, partial 
privatization reduces the expected utility of the managers when they collude, since the private 
firms have no incentive to increase employment, and will not be part of the collusive 
arrangements. The expression for expected utility is now given by 
E(UC) =   -λ[(1-α)β]2 + Ty - 2λαβ2(m/(n-1)).    (13) 
Where the last negative term reflects the tax on employment paid by public firms 
when they collude and raise employment. It can be verified that the one shot incentive to 
deviate from the collusive scheme is unaffected. We therefore conclude that partial 
privatization makes collusion harder to sustain, by reducing the payoff from colluding.  
There is an additional informational role that partial privatization can play, which is 
possibly more important. When public firms collude, expected employment in the public firm 
is given αβ+E(Zi), while expected employment in the private firm  is given by E(Zi)-σ. Thus 
the difference in expected employment in the two sectors equals αβ+σ, rather than just σ in 
the absence of collusion. Thus the central authorities will learn over time about the collusive 
behavior in the public sector, and can therefore take steps to undermine it, possibly by 
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increasing the taxes on employment in the incentive scheme. In other words, employment in 
the private sector can be a useful benchmark for providing incentives to the public sector 
managers. The private sector will not be part of a culture of excess employment and be an 
independent source of information to discipline public  firm managers.9
Consider the implications of this model in the context of Bangladesh. Our hypothesis 
is that the central authorities were increasingly able to use yardstick competition, vis-à-vis the 
private sector, as a way of controlling excess employment in the public sector relatively 
cheaply. This hypothesis implies that public sector excess employment is likely to diminish 
over time as the informational rents enjoyed by the public sector managers diminish. As a 
caveat, we should also emphasize that the model we have developed is illustrative, and is 
intended to allow us to interpret the data, and indeed other interpretations may well be 
consistent with our empirical findings. Based on these considerations, our empirical 
specification for employment in each category of employee is as follows: 
ln(Eit) = αi + δt +γtOit + ηit ,                            (14) 
where αi  is the firm-specific effect, δt is the term capturing industry wide time varying 
effects, and ηit  is a white-noise error term. Oit, the ownership dummy, takes a value of 1 
when the firm is publicly owned, and is zero if the firm is privately owned. The parameter of 
interest is γt, which is the effect of ownership on employment. This is allowed to be period 
specific, in order to capture the effect of the changing constraints upon public sector 
behaviour. Our interest is on how the estimates of γt evolve over time. 
 
9 The recent mechanism design literature investigates mechanisms, which are robust to 
collusion – e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2000) and Tangeras (2002). Our point is somewhat 
different, since we argue that institutional and ownership change makes collusion 
unsustainable, by changing the objective functions of agents. 
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Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we outline a couple of other implications 
of the argument of this section. Our argument suggests that partial privatization may play a 
useful informational role, in disciplining the firms, which remain in the public sector. Indeed, 
in many developing countries and transitional economies, shortages of capital and 
entrepreneurial skills imply that large-scale privatization may be impossible. In addition, 
there maybe political constraints on large-scale privatization.10 In this context, partial 
privatization may be very appealing, since only a small fraction of any given industry need be 
privatized in order to provide informational benefits. If there is noise in information provided 
by private firms, then this fraction cannot be too small, so the signal utilized in yardstick 
competition is sufficiently accurate. However, the informational benefits from marginal 
privatizations within the same industry are likely to be declining in the extent of privatization, 
so that partial privatization may well be optimal in the presence of other costs of privatization.  
Our analysis of the role of yardstick information in the regulation of public firms also 
has implications for the interpretation of the empirical evidence on the effects of ownership 
on economic performance. One strand of this literature (Caves and Christensen, 1980; Martin 
and Parker, 1995; Kole and Mulherin, 1997) finds that product market conditions rather than 
ownership is the important factor promoting efficiency.11 They find that under competitive 
conditions, there are no significant efficiency differences between private and public firms. 
Our model suggests that information revelation rather than product market competition may 
be playing the critical role here. Furthermore, it is not merely competition, as expressed for 
example in the number of firms, but the heterogeneity of ownership, which promotes public 
sector efficiency. 
 
10 In transition economies, capital shortages imply that large scale privatization be associated 
with widespread foreign ownership of “strategic” sectors, which may be politically unpopular. 
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Our analysis also suggests that the magnitude of excess employment may depend 
systematically upon our ability to measure it. Measuring ownership effects is inherently a 
difficult problem -- cross sectional studies cannot  control for firm specific fixed effects (or 
industry specific effects, if private and public firms are in different sectors), while studies of 
the privatization of natural monopolies may not be able to control for time varying effects. If 
regulators of public firms are also constrained by the same data limitations as empirical 
economists are, this suggests that regulation will be more successful where inference about 
ownership effects can be made with more confidence. Thus if central authorities are 
concerned with controlling excess employment, we may expect excess employment to be 
lower in those instances, where we as empirical economists are able to measure it with 
confidence--- the magnitude of excess employment will be inversely related to our ability to 
measure it.  
The information revelation role of the yardstick competition with heterogeneous 
ownership also applies to other contexts. For example, when foreign firms enter a protected 
market, consumers and the shareholders of domestic firms may gain new information on 
possibilities. Competition between existing firms may not play the same role since managers 
may be reluctant to abandon their mutual accommodation. 
3. Empirical Results 
We have data on firm-level employment, for the following categories of employee - 
officers, staff and manual. There are three types of manual workers:  permanent, temporary 
and casual12. It is useful to distinguish two broad groups- white-collar, which consists of the 
officer and staff categories, and manual workers. The data on total manual workers is less 
11 Boardman and Vining (1989), Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) and Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) find significant efficiency differences.  
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reliable as it measures less accurately the variable of interest. Since the employment of casual 
workers can fluctuate on a day- to-day basis, and our data pertain to employment at a point in 
time, the margin of error in treating this as average  employment over the year may be large. 
These problems do not arise with white-collar employment, where there is no casual 
component. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the relevant years for public and private 
sectors. The public sector firm, on average is larger than the private sector form, as shown by 
employment and capacity indicators. The table shows that there was an increase in white-
collar employment in the public sector between 1983 and 1988 despite a decline in average 
capacity. In the private sector, on the other hand, average capacity increases, but employment 
declines in both white- collar and blue -collar categories. In the period after 1988, public 
sector employment trends in white-collar categories tracks the trend in the private sector. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the mean percentage change in employment relative to 1983, at 
mill level, for the two sectors.  We find that the public sectors had significantly expanded the 
employment of all permanent workers (white-collar workers as well as permanent manual 
workers) up to 1988, although total employment of manual workers shows a slight decline. 
However, workers were retrenched in the following years and by 1994, there was a large 
decline in employment of all categories of workers. The decline was significant in the manual 
worker category. In the private sector on the other hand, we find evidence of retrenchment in 
the white-collar categories as early as 1988. Employment declined further in subsequent years 
and was more evenly distributed across white collar and manual worker categories compared 
to the public sector.  
Table 4 reports the evolution of aggregate output, sector-wise, for the years we have 
firm level employment data, relative to the 1982 benchmark. We have data on aggregate 
12Casual workers have a more precarious employment status than temporary workers, since 
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output for the private and public sectors, for all the years since 1982, and also have firm level 
data on output for 1982. Since we do not have firm level output data for the later years, we 
rely on aggregate sector-level output data for our analysis.13  Public sector output contracted 
quite sharply. By 1994, output was 27% lower compared to output in 1982. In contrast, the 
private sector was higher in 1988 and only 5% lower in 1991.  The final column of the table 
reports the difference in output changes between the two sectors – on average, public sector 
output declined faster than private sector output.  
These output data suggest that one may use two alternative benchmarks to measure 
“excess employment” in the public sector in any year. The first measure, which we label the 
unadjusted measure, is the difference between the change in employment in the public sector 
and the change in employment in the private sector, in that year, where the change is 
computed relative to 1983. This is the measure, which is used by Bhaskar and Khan (1995). 
Alternatively, one can adjust this figure for the differential change in sectoral outputs. If we 
assume that employment requirements for any category of worker are proportional to the 
output produced, we should subtract the difference in output change between sectors from the 
unadjusted measure of excess employment, to get the adjusted measure. Note here that in 
performing this adjustment we are using aggregate sectoral outputs, rather than firm level 
outputs, since we do not have data on firm level output for all years.  
Our main results are in table 5, which presents two measures for excess employment 
(unadjusted and adjusted), by category of worker and for each year in our sample. Our results 
differ between the white-collar and manual categories, but are rather similar within each of 
they are hired on a day-to-day basis.  
13 The two sets of data seem quite consistent for the years in which we have both. Two of our 
privatized firms were still in the public sector in 1982-83, and only privatized subsequently. 
We have made adjustments in the aggregate data to take this into account. We choose 1982 as 
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these categories. For white-collar employees, in 1988 there was a large amount of excess 
employment, of the order of 30 percent by the unadjusted measure, for both managers and 
clerical staff. However, unadjusted excess employment declined secularly in subsequent 
years. The public sector still had positive excess employment by the end of the period, but 
this is not statistically significant. Indeed, there is no significant difference in unadjusted 
excess employment in the category of clerical workers by 1994 and in managerial workers by 
1992. However, when we take into account the larger output contraction in the public sector, 
adjusted excess employment of white-collar workers turned out to be larger and remained 
statistically significant throughout this period. Nevertheless, adjusted excess employment in 
the managerial category diminished from 50% in 1988 to 11% in 1994 for managers and from 
47% to 17% for clerical staff. 
For manual workers, the picture is rather different. Although there was no significant 
excess employment of total manual workers in 1988, by the unadjusted measure, the adjusted 
measure showed an excess employment of the order of 18%.  However, by 1991 the public 
sector has negative excess employment of total manual workers according to the adjusted 
measure, and by 1994, this is also true for the permanent manual worker category, which 
should be measured with greater accuracy. This suggests that public sector managers may 
have concentrated the bulk of employment reductions upon  manual workers rather than white 
collar workers, since the former were less able to resist such cuts.  
To summarize, we find that employment of white-collar workers fell dramatically in 
the privatized mills following privatization in 1982.  The public sector did not immediately 
follow the private sector in reducing white-collar employment. However, from 1991 the 
employment levels in the public sector started to decline, although this decline was less than 
our benchmark in the case of output since there was no constraint on adjusting output, unlike 
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the fall in relative sectoral output, so that some excess white collar employment remains.  For 
manual workers, the fall in employment mirrored that of relative output, so that excess 
employment is eliminated (and indeed becomes negative) even by the adjusted measure by 
the end of the period.  This behavior over the period, with the gradual convergence of the 
public sector towards the employment norms in the public sector, is consistent with our 
argument that private sector behavior provided valuable information to the central authorities 
and allowed them to control managers.  
While our empirical results provide some support for the theoretical model of the role 
of privatization, we must emphasize that other explanations are also possible. For example, 
the central authorities may have been increasingly constrained financially in the 1990s, and 
this may have increased the pressures to reduce public sector employment. To investigate this 
possibility, we consider total employment in public sector non-financial corporations other 
than jute, reported in table 6. From 1984 we find that total public sector non-jute employment 
rises sharply, and doubles by 1988. This figure is maintained in 1992, and then declines, so 
that the 1994 figure is about 19% lower than the 1992 level. Nevertheless, this is still 60% 
above the 1984 level.14 In contrast, the first column shows that average employment public 
sector jute mills is approximately constant till 1988, but then falls sharply, so that it is 40% 
below its 1983 level in 1994. This suggests that generalized financial pressures are not 
entirely responsible for the fall in public sector jute employment. Finally, it could also be 
argued that the Voluntary Departure Scheme (VDS) introduced by the central authorities 
played an important role in reducing public sector jute employment. This is undoubtedly true; 
employment, where there was a bar on laying off workers for a year after privatization. 
14 This figure overstates the fall in public sector employment since some of the reduction is 
due to privatization and re-classification of enterprises, and it also includes the jute sector. 
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however, it is also likely that revelation of the extent of excess employment by yardstick 
competition facilitated the introduction of the VDS. 
4. Concluding Comments 
We have argued in this paper that partial privatization, in conjunction with yardstick 
competition, can provide useful information for the regulation of public firms. Evidence in 
support of this argument comes from the dynamics of employment in the partially privatized 
jute industry in Bangladesh. The privatized mills take the lead in reducing employment, but 
this is followed thereafter by the public sector, and excess public sector employment is 
gradually reduced, in all categories.  This behavior of the public sector can be interpreted as 
the fact that private sector employment norms made more transparent, to the central 
authorities, the general populace as well as international financial agencies such as the World 
Bank, the extent of excess employment, which was being supported by the public sector.  
Notwithstanding the partial convergence of employment norms across the two sectors, 
we find that excess white collar is both larger to begin with and persists to a greater degree, as 
compared to the employment of manual workers. We have suggested that this could be due to 
sociological reasons – decision-makers in the public sector may have bonds of affinity with 
middle class employees, and would be less inclined to sack them. Alternatively, this could be 
due to greater political voice of this educated and articulate class. These explanations are 
obviously incomplete, and our work suggests a need for explanations for such a white-collar 
bias within a populist political economy. 
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TABLE 1: AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT AND CAPACITY BY SECTOR 
  EMPLOYMENT 
PUBLIC 
(EMPLOYEES) 
 CAPACITY 
   PUBLIC  
( LOOMS) 
EMPLOYMENT 
PRIVATE  
(EMPLOYEES) 
CAPACITY 
PRIVATE  
(LOOMS) 
1983 MANAGERIAL 122.2 465.2 72.2 248.8 
 CLERICAL 406.2  244.4  
 MANUAL 4636.3  2482.0  
1988 MANAGERIAL 149.4 395.2 65.9 311.3 
 CLERICAL 450.3  213.0  
 MANUAL 4568.1  2407.8  
1992 MANAGERIAL 110.7 395.2 62.4 341.3 
 CLERICAL 352.3  212.9  
 MANUAL 2799.5  2139.5  
1994 MANAGERIAL 90.3 395.2 57.8 341.3 
 CLERICAL 279.9  173.8  
 MANUAL 2541.5  1893.9  
NOTE: Number of mills: 31 state owned mills and 31 privatized mills. 
SOURCE: Bangladesh Jute Mills Association. Employment Records, Dhaka. Bangladesh Jute 
Mills Corporation. Employment Records, Dhaka. 
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TABLE 2: % CHANGE IN WHITE-COLLAR EMPLOYMENT RELATIVE TO 1983  
YEAR CATEGORY 
OF EMPLOYEE 
 
PUBLIC  
SECTOR 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
EXCESS 
EMPLOYMENT IN 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
1988 MANAGERIAL 0.22 
 
-0.09 
 
0.31 
(5.4)** 
 CLERICAL 0.16 
 
-0.12 
 
0.28 
(3.3)** 
1991 MANAGERIAL 0.01 
 
-0.09 
 
0.10 
(1.7)** 
 CLERICAL -0.05 
 
-0.17 
 
0.12 
(1.4*) 
1992 MANAGERIAL -0.08 
 
-0.14 
 
0.06 
(1.1) 
 CLERICAL -0.14 
 
-0.16 
 
0.02 
(0.3) 
1994 MANAGERIAL -0.24 
 
-0.25 
 
0.01 
(0.2) 
 
 
CLERICAL -0.30 
 
-0.37 
 
0.07 
(0.8) 
NOTE: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 3: % CHANGE IN MANUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIVE TO 1983 
YEAR CATEGORY 
OF EMPLOYEE 
 
PUBLIC  
SECTOR 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
EXCESS 
EMPLOYMENT IN 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
1988 TOTAL -0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 
(0.1) 
 PERMANENT 0.14 
 
0.06 
 
0.08 
(2.0)** 
1991 TOTAL -0.39 0.06 
 
-.45 
(7.8)** 
 PERMANENT -0.40 -0.08 -0.32 
(7.9)** 
1992 TOTAL -0.50 -0.15 
 
-0.35 
(6.0)** 
 PERMANENT -0.39 -0.12 
 
-0.27 
(6.8)** 
1994 TOTAL 
MANUAL 
-0.53 -.27 
 
-0.26 
(4.5)** 
 PERMANENT -0.50 -0.27 
 
-0.23 
(5.6)** 
 
NOTE: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 4: % CHANGE IN OUTPUT RELATIVE TO 1982 
 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE DIFFERENCE 
1988 -16 +3 -19 
1991 -36 -5 -31 
1992 -25 -10 -15 
1994 -27 -17 -10 
 
Source:  Bangladesh Jute Mills Association and Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation Reports. 
Information on sectoral output (in tons), supplemented by firm-level data for 1982. 
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TABLE 5: EXCESS EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (PERCENT) 
  1988 1991 1992 1994 
Unadjusted 
 
31 
(5.4**) 
10 
(1.7**) 
6 
(1.1) 
1 
(0.2) 
 
   MANAGERS 
Adjusted 
 
50 
(8.7**) 
41 
(7.0**) 
21 
(3.9**) 
11 
(2.2**) 
Unadjusted 
 
28 
(3.3**) 
12 
(1.4*) 
2 
(0.3) 
7 
(0.8) 
 
CLERICAL 
Adjusted 
 
47 
(5.5**) 
43 
(5.0**) 
17 
(2.6**) 
17 
(1.9**) 
Unadjusted 
 
-1 
(0.1) 
-45 
(7.8**) 
-35 
(6.0**) 
-26 
(4.5**) 
TOTAL 
MANUAL 
Adjusted 
 
18 
(1.8**) 
-14 
(2.4**) 
-20 
(3.4**) 
-16 
(2.8**) 
Unadjusted 
 
8 
(2.0**) 
-32 
(7.9**) 
-27 
(6.8**) 
-23 
(5.6**) 
PERMANENT 
MANUAL 
Adjusted 
 
27 
(6.8**) 
-1 
(0.2) 
-12 
(3.0**) 
-13 
(3.2**) 
NOTE: Unadjusted excess employment is the difference in difference estimate of (log) 
employment, category wise. The adjusted figure subtracts the mean difference in difference in 
log output between the two sectors.   
*  Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 6: CHANGES IN NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT  
 JUTE NON JUTE (thousands) 
 AVERAGE 
PER MILL 
INDEX TOTAL  INDEX 
1984 5165 100 80.1    100 
1988 5168 100 158.2     197.5  
1992 3263 63.1 160.7    200.9 
1994 2912 56.4 131.2    163.4    
Sources: For aggregate non financial public employment, Bakht and Bhattacharya (1991), 
Table 16, and World Bank and Asian Development Bank (May 2003),  Bangladesh Public 
Expenditure Review, Statistical Appendix Table A.3.2. Data on  average jute employment 
as in table 1 (1983 figure used for 1984, for ensuring comparability). 
 
 
